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Equity and Justice in Global Warming Policy 
 
Summary 
Many countries are implementing or at least considering policies to counter increasingly 
certain negative impacts from climate change. An increasing amount of research has been 
devoted to the analysis of the costs of climate change and its mitigation, as well as to the 
design of policies, such as the international Kyoto Protocol, post-Kyoto negotiations, regional 
initiatives, and unilateral actions. Although most studies on climate change policies in 
economics have considered efficiency aspects, there is a growing literature on equity and 
justice. Climate change policy has important dimensions of distributive justice, both within 
and across generations, but in this paper we survey only studies on the intragenerational 
aspect, i.e., within a generation. We cover several domains including the international, 
regional, national, sectoral and inter-personal, and examine aspects such as the distribution of 
burdens from climate change, climate change policy negotiations in general, implementation 
of climate agreements using tradable emission permits, and the uncertainty of alternatives to 
emission reductions. 
 
Keywords: Economics of Climate Change, Intragenerational Equity, Distributive Justice 
 
JEL Classification: D62, D63, H23, H41, Q00 
 
Kverndokk is indebted to funding from the Norwegian Research Council (Environment 2015). 
We are indebted to discussions with Johan Eyckmans and to comments from Ole Jørgen 














Address for correspondence: 
 
Snorre Kverndokk 




E-mail: snorre.kverndokk@frisch.uio.no 1.  Introduction 
Equity is a major criterion on which to base any policy (Rawls, 1971), also environmental 
policy. In this paper we focus on climate change policy as climate change is characterized by 
several unique considerations that make equity especially important. First it is a 
transboundary problem of global scale. This means it requires a global solution. Since there is 
no supra-national authority to impose policy remedies, the solution requires the voluntary 
cooperation of sovereign states. International treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol, have made 
progress in gaining cooperation, at least among industrialized countries.
2 One feature of the 
treaty that helped garner cooperation was a set of “flexibility mechanisms” that capitalize on 
the mutual gains from trade, such as multilateral emissions trading, or more modest bilateral 
cooperation through Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. These 
policy instruments have the potential to reduce the overall costs of mitigating greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) substantially. However, appeals to cost-effectiveness have not been enough to 
bring many countries on board, and there are strong indications that equity and related issues 
are the dominant considerations. In essence, many are concerned about the cost impact of the 
mitigation burden on themselves and in relation to others. Several principles of fairness have 
been used as excuses for not ratifying the treaty. For example, the U.S. has pointed to the fact 
that several large emitters, such China and India, have not committed to GHG reduction. In 
turn, developing countries point to their relative lack of resources and the fact that the 
industrialized countries failed to do anything about the problem when they were at a similar 
key stage of economic development. Less attention has been paid to the uneven international 
distribution of the negative impacts (and even some positive impacts) of climate change on 
human health, other species, resources and the environment, but this is an important issue as 
well.  
 
Another relatively unique equity consideration relates to the time horizon of the climate 
change problem. GHGs have long residence times in the atmosphere, in some cases as much 
as thousands of years. Hence, the actions of the current generation have profound implications 
for those in the future. The intergenerational equity issue and the associated sustainability 
                                                 
2 The Kyoto Protocol calls for the reduction of the six major categories of greenhouse gases (GHGs) for the first 
compliance of 2008-12. The original signatories in 1997 were thirty-eight industrialized and transitional 
economies, including the U.S., agreeing to an overall 5.2 percent reduction in GHGs. To go into effect, the treaty 
required that at least 55 percent of the world's countries, generating at least 55 percent of total GHGs, ratified the 
treaty. This threshold was attained in February 2005. The U.S. signed but never ratified the treaty. Several other 
large countries including China, which recently surpassed the U.S. as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, have 
not ratified the treaty as well. 
 3issues are, however beyond the scope of this paper, which will focus on various aspects of 
intra-generational burden sharing. The reader is referred to Arrow et al. (1996) and also the 
discussion of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), such as the papers by Dasgupta (2006), 
Nordhaus (2007), and Weitzman (2007). 
 
While the international domain is the main focus in this paper, we will also examine other 
aspects of equity. Equity is important at two levels of policy below the international level. 
Although the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, hundreds of its cities, states, and 
regions have made commitments to the Protocol or to remission reductions in general. Several 
cooperative ventures are underway, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
among several Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States. Although interregional equity issues were 
downplayed in the original formation of this cooperative arrangement, they are starting to rise 
in terms of participants wanting to renegotiate their original commitments as the target date 
nears and the difficulty of implementation becomes more imminent. More recent efforts, such 
as the Western (States) Climate Initiative (WCI), are starting to address equity issues more 
actively at the outset of their negotiations. Although disparities are not as great in the context 
of a single country as in the international case, tensions can become sizeable, especially since 
competitive changes and relocation possibilities are more evident. Moreover, conflicts of 
fiscal federalism, such as which jurisdiction should control carbon tax or emission permit 
auction revenues, loom on the horizon as momentum in the U.S. grows for a national strategy 
based on nation-wide emissions trading. However, states may be reluctant to cooperate in a 
national effort. If emissions permits are auctioned rather than freely granted, or if a carbon tax 
is implemented instead to supplement emissions trading in some sectors, the control over 
sizeable revenues is at stake. In addition to arguments over rights and power, equity concerns 
are already being voiced in relation to state needs and the traditional unevenness of the 
distribution of federal expenditures out of any revenues.  
 
Another level of analysis can be performed at the meso-scale in terms of the distribution of 
policy impacts across sectors. Again, climate mitigation policy is rather unique, in that its 
impacts are likely to fall heavily on a narrow range of sectors. Because most GHG emissions 
emanate from fossil fuel extraction, transformation, and end-use, the coal, oil, and gas sectors 
are likely to be most affected. Ordinarily, uneven sectoral impacts may not receive much 
attention or sympathy. However, the impacts on these sectors might be extreme to the point of 
a demise of the coal industry in many countries. While mine owners may be among the high 
 4income group members, mine workers, especially those who are not unionized, are closer to 
the bottom rungs, and inhabit many relatively poor regions such as Appalachia in the U.S. At 
the same time, some sectors are likely to reap sizeable rewards, including renewable energy 
and perhaps nuclear power. The agricultural and forestry sectors may gain sizeable revenues 
as well from plant sequestration for carbon, and the oil and gas industries through geological 
sequestration. 
 
Another level of concern over equity is at the inter-personal level, where the traditional focus 
is on the size distribution of income. Policy instruments are often evaluated in terms of their 
progressivity (i.e., whether higher income groups are impacted more than lower income 
groups). Climate change policy is somewhat unique here as well, because it bears heavily on 
energy prices, prices of a basic necessity. It is not surprising that most studies to date indicate 
that carbon taxes or emissions trading are likely to be regressive. Beyond income groups, 
there are other interpersonal dimensions. Another unique aspect of climate change itself is 
that it would have relatively stronger adverse effects on the aged or infirm, primarily through 
higher temperatures but also through health-related effects relating to water quality and the 
increase in vector-borne infectious diseases. 
  
Still another equity dimension relates to race and ethnicity, which is the basis for the modern 
Environmental Justice (EJ) movement, a combination of activism and intellectual inquiry. The 
movement's original focus was on the fact that many toxic waste sites were located in or near 
minority neighborhoods. Although one explanation is that the poor tend to reside closer to 
industrial sites because of lower property values, the EJ conclusion is that minority groups are 
hit even harder because of their lack of political power and a tradition of exploitation. This 
has led to opposition to emissions trading. Although the location of GHG reduction does not 
matter because it is a globally-mixed pollutant, reduction of co-pollutants (e.g., sulfur oxides, 
particulates, air toxics) does. In this light, minority neighborhoods might not gain a potential 
reduction of these co-pollutants if the major local emitters buy permits and thereby refrain 
from taking actions that will lower emissions of all pollutants. In a related vein, many GHG 
mitigation measures have the ability to generate jobs related to mitigation in these local areas 
if permits were not purchased there.  
 
 
 5The distribution of impacts is important for more than just normative reasons. The energy 
industry is a powerful interest group in many countries or regions, and these uneven impacts 
have already given rise to a call to arms and effective blocking of many climate change 
policies. The uneven sectoral impacts can be muted significantly by flexibility in trading 
across geographic areas and sectors, as well as trading over time (permit borrowing) to allow 
for technological change, such as bringing down the cost of carbon separation and capture, 
and reducing the possibility of seepage from geological sequestration). Likewise, there is 
increasing sensitivity to the plight of the poor and minorities in many countries, and the 
climate policy that is likely to result in inequities in these arenas will have a much more 
limited chance for approval and implementation.  
 
Extensive academic research and practical ingenuity have been brought to bear on the various 
dimensions of equity and climate change policy. In this paper, we summarize and critically 
evaluate the literature and the evolution of recent policy in this area. The emphasis is on the 
international domain, where most of the research and practice has taken place. In section 2 we 
begin by defining central concepts such as efficiency, equity and justice, as well as 
summarizing the main theories underlying these important concepts. This is useful to 
understand the discussion in the following sections, where we first start with the burdens of 
climate change and climate change policies, focusing on both the burdens following from 
climate impacts as well as mitigation (Section 3). Section 4 surveys questions of equity in 
international climate negotiations, while section 5 focuses on the implementation of climate 
agreements using price incentives (taxes and tradable emission permits). We then take a look 
at equity principles that have actually been used (Section 7), and in Section 8 we shortly 
discuss equity and uncertainty giving examples from geoengineering and adaptation. We 
conclude with some suggestions for further research. 
 
2.  Theories of equity and justice
3 
2.1 Definition of concepts 
The concepts of efficiency and equity are central in policy analyses. While Pareto Optimality, 
a situation characterized, in part, by no waste of resources, is an accepted efficiency principle, 
there is not a consensus on a “best” equity principle. As a result, most economic analyses 
have concentrated on efficiency problems, and equity often plays a secondary role in 
                                                 
3 The discussion in this section is based heavily on our previous work (see Rose and Kverndokk, 1999, 2004; and 
Kverndokk and Rose, 2004). 
 6economic policy making (Johansson-Stenman, 1998), even if it will always play an important 
role as a principle of social interactions. 
 
While equality usually means equal allocations of resources or egalitarianism, distinguishing 
between the related concepts of equity, fairness, and justice, may in general be difficult, and 
many of the studies on global warming policies referred in this paper do not attempt to make 
extensive distinctions. However, both fairness and equity are often given a specific meaning 
in economic theory and philosophical theories of justice and alternative equity principles exist 
(see 3.3. below).
4 Justice is sometimes taken to be an umbrella term, incorporating all 
dimensions of evaluation besides efficiency (see, e.g., Hausman and McPherson, 1993). For 
instance equality is central in John Rawls definition of justice (Rawls, 1971). 
 
Another distinction is between is between fair, equal or just on the one hand, and good on the 
other. While in many analyses these concepts do not mean the same thing as good, they may 
also help provide a precise definition to what is good. For instance, in ethical reasoning, there 
are two ways to justify if an action is good or bad. The first is to refer to the consequences. 
Based on this, an action is good if it is the best way (e.g., least effort) to attain the aim we 
strive for (e.g, maximize welfare, reduce greenhouse gas emissions). This is often referred to 
as substantive fairness or consequentialism, and is also related to distributive justice, which is 
concerned with the allocation of scarce resources (Roemer, 1996). Thus, in our context this 
would mean incidence of benefits and costs. 
  
However, another way of moral thinking states that consequences alone do not guide us 
whether something is right or wrong (procedural fairness). This is related to the process by 
which outcomes are reached. It is not enough to know that the action is the most effective way 
to attain the aim. Thus, the claim that the “ends justify the means” is not necessarily true 
according to this way of moral thinking. 
 
2.2 Welfare maximization 
                                                 
4 Some examples are Feldman and Kirman (1974) who define fairness as non-envy, i.e., no agent prefers what 
another has to what he himself has, while Varian (1974) defines equity as non-envy and a fair allocation as both 
equitable and Pareto efficient. Another often used criterion of equity is proportionality (see e.g., Konow, 2000), 
where the fair rewards are in proportion to the contributions that individuals’ control, such as hours worked, but 
are not related to factors they do not control such innate abilities or inherited wealth. 
 7One branch of mainstream economics addresses equity by formalizing the concept of a Social 
Welfare Function (SWF), which is able to rank all states of the economy, and thus policy 
outcomes as well, on the basis of performance criteria such as efficiency and equity. One 
advantage of the approach is that it is able to separate these two criteria, though tradeoffs 
between them can still prevail. Although many alternative equity principles exist (see 3.3 
below), the one most prevalently used in this approach is “vertical” equity, which holds that 
equity increases as utility (or income) disparities between individuals decrease.  
 
The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics stipulates that a perfectly competitive 
economy will achieve an overall efficient (Pareto Optimal) allocation of resources. However, 
the market is blind to equity, so efficient outcomes as well as inefficient outcomes in the 
presence of externalities like pollution, may have undesirable distributional implications, 
giving rise to calls for remedial policy. The approach makes efficiency-equity tradeoffs clear.  
For example, progressive taxation is typically believed to have equity-promoting, as well as 
inefficiency causing effects. The size of such disincentive effects is of course an empirical 
question, although many studies indicate that they are in practice rather small (e.g., Danziger 
et al., 1986). We can be more certain of achieving equity with the minimum of efficiency loss 
if we utilize “lump sum” transfers, or if we avoid price-distorting policies. The difficulty is 
that in practice there are few lump sum transfers, i.e., transfers that are not based on effort. 
  
One way out of the efficiency-equity tradeoff is offered by the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960), 
which states that in the case of externalities the delineation and assignment of property rights 
will lead, through market exchange, to an efficient allocation of resources, irrespective of how 
the rights are distributed (assuming transaction costs are small and that there are no significant 
income effects). For years, the secondary clause of this theorem--that the distribution of 
property rights would not affect efficiency--was used as a justification to ignore equity, since 
it had no affect on efficiency. Ironically, it now offers a reason to address it. For example, as 
noted in the introduction, equity is especially important where voluntary cooperation is 
required so distributional issues do matter. Moreover, one of the major ways to influence the 
equity outcome of mitigation policy is to use an emissions trading approach and to adjust the 
initial allocation of permits accordingly. This is further discussed in sections 3.3 and 5.3 
below. Thus, equity can be addressed head-on without undercutting efficiency. Alternatively, 
equity can be promoted in a case of a carbon tax by the redistribution or spending of the 
 8carbon tax revenues, see section 3.4. However, in this case, redistribution may not have the 
attractive neutral feature of the Coase Theorem with regard to the equity-efficiency tradeoff. 
 
2.3 Social justice 
A theory of justice is a normative theory. Such a theory has two aspects. First, it will regulate 
individual rights (and duties), and second, it will propose or evaluate a distribution of goods 
(and burdens). Different theories of justice may weight these two aspects differently. They 
are, for instance given equal weight by utilitarians
5, while Rawls (1971) gives political 
freedom and rights a lexicographical priority over economic distribution. 
 
Below, we consider philosophical theories of justice (global justice theories), i.e., theories that 
are centrally designed for the whole society and are intended to compensate people for 
various sorts of bad luck, that may result in low levels of income. We will not consider 
theories for decentralized distribution decisions (local justice theories), that are considered 
independent of other distribution decisions, such as who shall perform military service, who 
shall receive organs for transplantation, etc., but will focus on theories that provides 
suggestions to society-wide problems such as income distributions (Elster, 1992). The 
framework is general and relates to many issues including environmental problems. 
 
2.3.1 Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is a sub-set of welfarism, i.e., theories that focus on welfare outcomes. The 
utilitarian aim is to distribute goods so as to maximize the total utility of members of the 
society, where “goods” are interpreted broadly to include economic goods, rights, freedom, 
and political power (see, e.g., Harsanyi 1955). A utilitarian welfare function is usually defined 
as the sum of the utility of all the members, i.e., all individuals have an equal weight. One 
problem with this function as well as for other forms of SWFs, is the interpersonal 
comparison of utility, which is not a straightforward issue. We will not examine these 
problems in this paper, but refer to, e.g., Arrow (1970). Even though utilitarianism does not 
explicitly address equity, its welfare maximization objective does have distributional 
implications as it proposes a certain distribution of goods as the optimal outcome.  
 
2.3.2 Rawlsian theory 
                                                 
5 Given that the arguments in the utility function can be both goods and rights. 
 9The theory of Rawls (1971) is basically a critique of utilitarianism. According to Rawls, 
utilitarianism has no respect for individuals. A person is not seen as valuable and worth 
protecting on his/her own right. Rawls argues that a theory of justice should respect the 
individuals as ends in themselves. 
 
The methodological starting point of Rawls theory is the “original position.” Many would 
argue for what is just or unjust depending on their own position in the society. Therefore, as a 
starting point to decide the basic structure of the society, which according to Rawls is the 
primary subject of justice, we have to think about a hypothetical and idealized world where all 
individuals sit behind a veil of ignorance; the original position. They do not know their 
abilities, sex, race or position in the society. All they know is that they are going to live in the 
society. In this hypothetical situation, Rawls argues that they will agree on certain principles: 
 
First principle: 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (Rawls, 1971; p. 250).  
Second principle: 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:  
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and  
b) attached to office and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunities (Rawls, 1971; pp. 302-3).  
 
The first principle, the “Principle of Greatest Equal Liberty,” is about individual rights (e.g., 
freedom of thought and liberty of conscience ). As it has a lexicographic priority, none of the 
basic liberties should be traded against material advancement. However, it is the first part of 
the second principle, the “Difference Principle,” that is mostly referred. One usual 
misinterpretation in economics is that Rawls argues for maximizing the utility of the least 
advantaged. But his theory is not utilitarian, and he argues for distributing “primary goods” 
(goods everybody needs to realize his/her plans of life independent of what the plan is). While 
the first principle distributes one subset of primary goods, the basic liberties, the Difference 
Principle distributes another subset including wealth, income, power, and authority. The last 
part of the second principle, the “Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity,” requires that we 
go beyond formal equality of opportunity to insure that persons with similar skills, abilities, 
and motivation enjoy equal opportunities. 
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Several critics have argued that Rawls went too far in reacting against welfarism. For 
example, Sen (1980) argues that primary goods are not the appropriate maximand. The focus 
should be on what goods do for people such as enabling people to escape from morbidity, to 
be adequately nourished, to have mobility, to achieve self-respect, to take part in community 
life and to be happy. Sen calls these functioning, and argues for equalizing them. For instance, 
if all primary goods except income were equalized among people, Rawls would argue that 
income should be equalized as well. However, a handicapped person would require more 
income than an able-bodied one, and needs a higher income to function in the same way. 
 
The most interesting new aspects of distribution and environmental policy pertain to 
transboundary pollution and the fairness of policies across regions and nations. However, 
Rawls’ original theory is basically a theory of justice within a nation. In his later work 
(Rawls, 1999), he is concerned about international justice. He argues that the welfare of the 
citizens is mainly the responsibility of the nation states and that the international community 
has a more supportive function, which is to secure a setting where national societies can 
develop positively. In addition to principles in his original theory he adds duties to honor 
human rights and to assist peoples in unfavorable conditions. This would also include 
international transfers to disadvantaged countries.  
  
2.3.3 Libertarian theory 
In libertarian theory, the baseline is that individual freedom prevails except where others may 
be harmed. Thus, this is in the same line as Pareto superiority saying that there is an 
improvement in welfare if one or more persons are made better off due to change in resource 
use as long as the other persons are at least as well off as before.  
 
Nozick (1974) has provided the best-known statement of libertarian thought. The theory can 
be summarized in three principles: justice in appropriation, justice in transfer, and justice in 
rectification. A distribution of goods is just if it is the end result of an unbroken chain of just 
transfers, beginning from a just original appropriation. If these conditions are not satisfied, 
justice in rectification requires that we should establish the distribution that would have 
occurred if all unjust links in the chain had been replaced by just ones. 
 
 11The first principle is a “finder’s keepers” principle, where the idea is that anyone has the right 
to appropriate, exploit, and enjoy the fruits of any unowned piece of nature. The principle of 
just transfers says that the outcome of any voluntary transaction between two or more 
individuals is just if there is no coercion. If individuals agree on a contract that will benefit all, 
there is no reason to stop the contract apart from the case where anyone uses its power to 
make the non-agreement state worse for the other parties. The last principle is the main 
weakness of the theory, as identifying the point in time where the earliest violation occurred 
and, thereafter, the counterfactual chain of just transfers, may be rather indeterminate. 
 
2.4 Principles of equity and justice 
We would like to distinguish between equity and justice principles. “Equity principles” may 
be defined as normative criteria for how a society should be organized, how goods or burdens 
should be distributed, etc. (see, e.g., Rose, 1990). On the other hand, “principles of justice” 
are basic rules underlying theories of justice, as most theories of justice are quite coarse-
grained. Thus, they can be interpreted as side constraints to these theories. Several principles 
of justice may be in accordance with one equity principle, and vice versa, see section 5.3 
below. 
 
Several global theories of justice give different equity principles for the distribution of goods 
and rights, see section 3.3 below. However, there may be common denominators in theories 
of distributive justice. Meta-principles are principles implicit in all global theories of justice. 
Elster (1992, 1993) claims two such meta-principles to be “ethical individualism” and “ethical 
presentism.”  
 
The view of ethical individualism (EI) is that justice is attached to individual human beings. It 
is a denial of supra-individual and non-human justice, the first treating groups, and the latter 
organic or inorganic nature, as subjects of justice. There are two claims of EI: (i) theories of 
justice should allocate goods among individuals, and (ii) this allocation should be made on the 
basis of information about individuals (Elster, 1993). 
 
The basis of ethical presentism (EP) is “... that past practices are irrelevant to distribution in 
the present, except to the extent that they have left morally relevant and causally efficacious 
traces in the present” (Elster, 1992; p. 200). A few examples may clarify this meta-principle. 
First, no one should have to suffer from crimes committed by his or her parents; one cannot 
 12choose ones parents. Nevertheless, if people are worse off today than they otherwise would 
have been because of discrimination against their parents, a claim for compensation is 
compatible with EP. However, compensation does not follow from EP, since meta-principles 
are only constraints in a justice evaluation. On the other hand, if people are worse off today 
because their parents wasted their resources, compensation is not compatible with EP. 
 
2.5 Environmental justice 
This approach to environmental policy differs from mainstream approaches at the outset, 
because it gives primacy to concerns about equity. It also differs in that focuses on the object 
of equity as disparities according to race, as opposed to income or other socioeconomic 
characteristics. Further, it integrates community activism with conventional and 
unconventional analysis and communication. Finally, its focus is typically local, though this 
has important bearing on the design and implementation of broader climate policy (see, e.g., 
Pastor, 2007).  Recent extensions to to global issues (se, e.g., Kutting, 2002; Hamilton, 2005) 
have not extended to climate policy at that scale, however. 
 
The EJ approach is especially skeptical of efficiency goals and explanations. Various 
independent scholars, faith-based groups, and government agencies have found a 
disproportionate number of hazardous waste sites in and around minority neighborhoods in 
the U.S. and several other countries. One explanation is that land values are lower there 
before the siting or after, and therefore that these locations are more prone to be inhabited by 
lower income groups. However, even controlling for income, many studies have found race to 
be a factor (Hamilton, 1995; Morello-Frosch et al., 1997). The explanations then range from 
mainstream concept of asymmetric information to more radical theories of exploitation. 
Moreover, despite government efforts to remedy the situation in the U.S. since the early 
1990s, the federal government’s own report indicates that little progress has been made 
(Report of the Office of the Inspector General, 2004). 
 
In the U.S., this perspective presents a possible obstacle to the implementation of cap and 
trade. Although GHGs are globally mixed pollutants, various co-pollutants of combustion and 
other processes are not. Thus, there is a concern that, locally, mitigation and permit purchases 
are not equivalent from an environmental standpoint. A locality or region that purchases 
permits to avoid having to mitigate GHGs would forego the opportunity for a reduction in 
particulates, sulfur oxides, air toxics, etc., and might even witness an increase up to the 
 13criteria pollutant limit. From an economic standpoint, the decision differs as well. The 
purchase of permits may be in the best interest of the emitting firm, but may not be so from 
the standpoint of the community. Some types of mitigation are seen as an opportunity to 
create additional jobs. At the same time, the job loss due to inefficient choices by emitting 
firms (passing up lower cost permits in favor of local mitigation) is not usually considered. 
Counter-arguments that permit auction revenues can be used to offset negative environmental 
or economic consequences are not well received by the EJ community given the severity of 
potential health problems from some co-pollutants and the distrust of government promises. 
 
Ironically, in one major way the EJ situation is just the opposite if extrapolated to the 
international level. Developing countries, typically comprised of non-whites, have relatively 
more low-cost mitigation/sequestration options and are thus more likely to be permit sellers 
and hence mitigate proportionally more of all pollutants than would industrialized countries.  
 
Another example where minority groups, as well as the poor in general, may be hit relatively 
harder by environmental policies is biofuels (see, e.g., Runge and Semaver, 2007). Corn 
prices have increased as corn is used in ethanol production, which has lead to higher food 
prices in the U.S. and in developing countries, culminating, for example, in tortilla riots in 
Mexico. Also, the demand for biofuels has had a negative impact on the Amazon and people 
living there. As soybean farmers are switching to corn in the U.S., Brazilian soybean farmers 
are displacing cattle pastures and these in turn are displacing the Amazon forest. 
 
In the remaining sections, we will discuss equity in climate change policies. While the equity 
problems discussed are mainly about distributive justice (consequences), we will also discuss 
procedural justice. As mentioned in the introduction, we will focus on intragenerational 
justice problems. Intergenarational justice related to global warming are mainly concentrated 
around the question what we should aim for, or how large the emissions or atmospheric 
concentration target should be. On the other side, intragenerational justice is mainly 
concerned about how we should distribute the burdens. While the distinction sometimes can 
be difficult, the discussion below gives some examples of intragenerational equity and justice 
related to global warming that have been discussed in the economic literature. 
 
3  The burdens of climate change and climate change policies 
 143.1 Who suffers most from climate change? 
Over the next decades, the world will probably face large climatic changes in form of 
increased temperature, sea level rise, changed wind and precipitation patterns, more extreme 
weather, etc. (IPCC, 2007). However, the damage of climate change will not be evenly 
distributed among countries or among the individuals in a country (Tol et al., 2000; Tol, 
2002a,b; Yohe et al., 2007). For increases in global mean temperatures less than 1-3˚C above 
1990 level, some impacts will be beneficial to some sectors and regions while costly to others, 
e.g., agricultural production may increase in Northern Europe, while it may be reduced in 
large parts of Africa. Global mean losses are expected to be 1-5% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) for 4˚C of warming, with larger losses in developing countries, and the net damage 
costs of climate change are likely to increase over time. Vulnerabilities also differ 
considerably between regions, and poorer countries will face higher negative impacts than 
richer countries. Development may, however, reduce overall vulnerability to climate change 
as richer countries seem to have a higher ability to adapt. The unequal distribution of impacts 
makes this a concern of distributive justice. 
 
While the estimation of damages is tied up to intergenerational equity as this represents a 
present value estimate, meaning that the discount rate is important (see, e.g., the discussion 
around Stern Review), there is also one aspect of intragenerational equity involved in the 
aggregation of damage estimates due to the uneven distribution of income across individuals 
and regions. One problem with damage cost estimates is that the values depend on income. 
Using the standard methodology from economics such as willingness to pay or accept, rich 
people (or countries) are willing to pay more or to require higher compensation than poor 
people (or countries). This means that even if consequences of global warming may be more 
severe in poor countries measured as lives lost, loss of biodiversity or in production measures 
such as GDP, the aggregated measure of damages may be lower than in richer countries. To 
deal with the unequal income distribution, one methodology that has been proposed in the 
literature is to use equity weights. The idea is that a dollar to a poor person is not the same as 
a dollar to a rich person, meaning that we cannot add up monetized losses. Instead we should 
add up welfare losses and then monetize. It follows from this that we should attach different 
weights to a given monetary loss, where the weight is higher in a poor country than in a rich 
country as the weight depends inversely on the income level. 
 
 15Equity weights have been discussed in cost-benefit analyses for several decades (see, e.g., 
Little and Mirrlees, 1974) and an early contribution in the context of global warming is 
Fankhauser et al. (1997). They showed that the aggregate damage figures based on equity 
weights significantly depend on the social welfare function chosen.
6 A recent study is Anthoff 
et al. (2007), who chose a utilitarian welfare function, and concluded that equity weighted 
estimates of the marginal damage of CO2 emissions are substantially higher than estimates 
without equity weights (by a factor of ten or more depending on the pure rate of time 
preference etc.). To find the monetary estimate of damages, the authors argue that the 
estimates should be normalized with the marginal utility of consumption of a specific region, 
and the estimates may also vary considerably with the region chosen. Further, estimates are 
also sensitive to the intraregional income distribution as well as assumptions on inequality 
aversion. The latter is important as different scenarios have different income distributions. 
The conclusion that the use of equity weights increases damage cost estimates is interesting. 
While the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) has been criticized for its high damage cost estimates 
due to a low discount rate (Nordhaus, 2007; Dasgupta, 2007), the review does not use equity 
weighting explicitly.
7 Thus, taking the uneven income distribution seriously may actually 
increase the damage cost estimates in the Stern Review. 
 
The fact that estimates vary depending on the social welfare function is a problem for policy 
making. When a specific welfare function is chosen, ethical views as well as other specific 
assumptions are made at the same time. Equity weighting assumes a social planner and 
specific social welfare function, but it is hard to formulate a social welfare function that 
represents the ethical views of all agents (Brekke et al., 1996). Another problem with equity 
weighting is that it has to be used consistently in economic policymaking and not just in some 
areas such as climate policy in order for policy making to be consistent. Further, aggregation 
of welfare losses across different countries assumes a supranational perspective such as a 
global social planner, but decisions are made by national decision makers. This is studied in 
Anthoff and Tol (2007), who focus on international equity weights in climate policies under 
national decision-making. They study four different ethical positions taken by the decision 
makers. In the first, decision makers do not care about what happens abroad (sovereignty). 
                                                 
6 Johansson-Stenman (2000) shows, however, that some of the most extreme and unintuitive results in 
Fankhauser et al. (1997) depend on misunderstandings with respect to permissible transformations of the utility 
function. 
7 The Stern Review recognizes equity weighting and increases the damage costs by 25% based on calculations in 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). However, the impacts of equity weighting are much lower in the Nordhaus and 
Boyer study than in most other studies, see, e.g., Anthoff et al. (2007) referred above. 
 16Second, they are altruistic towards people living in other countries (altruistic). Third, the 
decision makers compensate damages done abroad (compensation), and fourth, the national 
decision makers feel responsible for damages done abroad, but cannot compensate (good 
neighbor). The different ethical views give very different estimates for marginal damage or 
carbon taxes (given that the tax is set equal to the marginal damage) at the national level, with 
the highest tax for good neighbors and lowest in the sovereignty case. Thus, this shows that a 
wide range of carbon taxes can be defended based on different ethical positions. 
 
The use of equity weights also triggers the discussion of equity versus efficiency. If one does 
not care about equity at all at the social level, introducing equity weights will imply large 
inefficiency losses (Harberger, 1978).
8 If one cares about equity, one alternative to base the 
policy on equity weighing is to redistribute income as when the income distribution is just, 
distributional weights will be identical (Fankhauser et al., 1997). It has been argued that it is 
socially inefficient to use equity weights in cost-benefit analysis and that this implies large 
inefficiency losses when distributional matters can be dealt with through income taxation 
instead (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979). While this may be a difficult task in international 
climate policy, Johansson-Stenman (2005) challenges this argument within a general 
framework in the context of national decision making, and shows a large range of cases where 
equity weights are (second-best) optimal to use. However, he concludes that the question of 
whether equity weights should be used cannot be answered in general, but depends on the 
proposed project or policy instrument. 
 
3.2 Will mitigation costs be evenly distributed? 
To avoid large impacts of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions reductions are 
necessary.
9 This would require increasing energy efficiency of production or even reduced 
production, interfuel substitution, changes in land use configurations, or other practices, most 
of which could lead to lower consumption levels. However, the costs of greenhouse gas 
mitigations are not evenly distributed among regions or countries. The recent IPCC report 
confirms the earlier reports in that even if the overall mitigation costs may not be very high
10, 
                                                 
8 One amusing example given in Harberger (1978) is to send ice-cream on camel-back across the desert from a 
richer oasis to a poorer one. With a high social inequality aversion, Harberger finds that “up to 63/64 of the ice-
cream could melt away without causing the project to fail the test”. 
9 Geoingeneering and other alternatives are discussed in Section 7. 
10 The costs of committing to the Kyoto Protocol may be less than 0.1% of GDP in Europe with flexible permit 
trading. Also, stabilization targets such as 550 or 650 ppm CO2-equivalents may be reached to a cost of about 
1% or lower of global GDP by 2030.  
 17the best economic potential for emission reductions is probably in non-OECD countries 
(Barker et al., 2007). Thus, cheap reduction options are mainly found in Eastern Europe and 
developing countries.
 11 In general, the mitigation costs of a country mainly depend on the 
level of energy-efficiency, the production structure, and the availability of renewable energy 
sources. We should also note that mitigation policies in one region have impacts on other 
regions in terms of their emission levels and mitigation costs, due to impacts on fossil fuel 
prices, competitiveness, technology spillovers etc. 
 
Above, equity weights were discussed as a way to aggregate and compare different damage 
cost estimates of climate change. The question remains if equity weights are relevant when it 
comes to mitigation costs. Azar (1999) shows that equity weighting may be appropriate here 
as well. Optimizing a global social welfare function, assuming that the world consists of a 
rich and a poor region, would require equality weights used also for mitigation costs in the 
poor region, but not in the rich. This follows as costs and benefits are normalized with the 
marginal utility of consumption in the rich region (see also Anthoff et al., 2007). In his 
approach, even if different weight factors used in the literature give substantially different 
damage estimates, they yield the same optimal emission reductions. The reason is that also 
mitigation costs are weighted in the same way, and this offsets the effect of different weighted 
damage estimates. This will be further discussed in Section 4.
12 
 
3.3 Equity principles of burden sharing 
Because there is no consensus on a best definition of equity, several alternative criteria have 
been put forth for the interregional and international analysis of the equity implications of 
environmental policy, most of them being extensions of interpersonal equity principles 
discussed above (Rose, 1992). Ten equity principles, a general operational rule emanating 
from each, and a corresponding rule applicable for the example of the allocation of tradable 
emission permits at the national level are presented in Table 1.
13 The principles are divided 
                                                 
11 For instance smaller CO2 emissions reductions (5-15%) by 2010 in China may give potentially positive GDP 
effects due to a double dividend effect (Garbaccio et al., 1999). 
12 Another intragenerational equity aspect is also important for optimal emission reductions. As mentioned 
above, Anthoff et al. (2007) found that damage estimates are sensitive to the inequality aversion. This is further 
confirmed in Shiell (2003) who calculates optimal global greenhouse gas emissions under various inter- and 
intragenerational equity assumptions including discounting and different equity weights for different world 
regions. She finds that the traditional conflict between ethical approaches (prescriptive) and market approaches 
(descriptive) can be significantly moderated with the introduction of another dimension of equity, namely the 
inequality aversion parameter in the utility functions. 
13 The principles presented are discrete measures of equity. A more general, continuous formulation of equity 
based on the Atkinson Inequality Index is examined by Eyckmans et al. (1993). 
 18into three categories. The first is “allocation-based’ criteria, which focus on the before-
implementation (before-trading) implications for mitigation costs. The “outcome-based” 
criteria focus on the post-implementation position, which would include mitigation costs and 
permit revenues/expenditures, as well as the benefits of the mitigation. The “process-based” 
criteria focus more on the conditions that lead to the outcome distinguishing between ideal 
political conditions, pragmatic political conditions, or pure market forces, respectively.
14 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Of course, there are other levels of application of equity criteria, including sectors and 
households. In some ways, these units are superior to regions, because they address the issue 
of relative impacts in terms of welfare of the individual (the basic unit in a democracy). 
Although policy-making will take place at a more aggregate level, it is important that equity 
at the international and interregional levels filter down to the micro (individual ) level, for 
which economic welfare is measured.   
 
To be operational, an equity criterion must be applied to a “reference base”, essentially a 
metric or index, which by itself has no ethical content, i.e., it is a quantity to which a specific 
value judgement needs to be applied to give it any explicit normative implications (Rose, 
1992; Rose and Stevens, 1998). Examples of reference bases are income, energy production, 
energy use, population, GHG emissions, etc. To illustrate the use of equity principles, 
consider permit trading and the following six permit allocation formulas for the initial 
allocation of permits
15 (consisting of an equity criterion and an associated reference base) 
applied at the regional level, where the reference base is in the parenthesis:  
 
1. Sovereignty  (emissions  based) 
2.  Sovereignty (energy-use based) 
3. Sovereignty  (energy-production  based) 
4.  Egalitarian (population based) 
5.  Economic Activity (GRP based) 
                                                 
14 Most of the principles presented in Table 1 are altruistic in nature. For an approach to equity issues based on 
self-interest discussed in other portions of this review, the reader is referred to UNCTAD (1992) and Barrett 
(2005).  Altruistic principles are more consistent with most notions of justice and fairness than are the non-
altruistic principles such as the Kantian imperative and "absence of envy." 
15 In section 5.3 below, we take a further look at the initial permit allocation from a philosophical point of view. 
 196.  Ability to Pay (inverse-GRP based) 
 
Note that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between criteria and reference bases. For 
example, the Sovereignty criterion can be implemented according to more than one reference 
base, and Gross Regional Product (GRP) can serve as a reference base for more than one 
criterion. Reference base distinctions are important for several reasons. First, as in the case of 
three bases applied to the Sovereignty criterion, they can reflect alternative energy policy 
positions. For example, Formula 5 simulates a “downstream” administered program on fossil 
energy end-users, while Formula 6 simulates an “upstream” program on fossil energy 
producers. Most importantly, the welfare implications of various references bases for the 
same equity criterion will differ as well, because each reference base leads to a different set of 
permit allocations and hence a different set of sales/purchases outcomes. 
 
The results of the application of the six equity formulas for permit trading to the sharing of 
the Kyoto Protocol target within the U.S. by Rose and Zhang (2004) yield some interesting 
results. First, for some of the formulas (e.g., Sovereignty/Energy Use), there is very little 
variation of welfare gains across regions, primarily because the mitigation costs before trading 
are relatively uneven and the volume of trading is not large. Second, for some regions (e.g., 
Southwest, Mid-Atlantic, New England) there is little difference across equity formulas, 
primarily because their permit allocations vary so little. For some regions, the equity formula 
does matter greatly (e.g., South Central, North Central), because of the positive correlation 
between their per capita incomes and population.  The results on this score differ greatly from 
their application in the international domain. For example, the egalitarian (per capita) criterion 
leads to the relatively lowest cost burden being incurred by one of the regions of the U.S. with 
the highest per capita income (North Central States), because this is also the most populous 
region. This is just the opposite of the result in the international domain, where countries such 
as China and India stand to gain the most from application of this criterion.  
 
Interestingly, the Rose-Zhang study and many on permit trading at the international level (see, 
e.g., Rose and Stevens, 1998; Rose et al., 1998) indicate that although equity principles differ 
significantly from a philosophical standpoint, many of them yield very similar outcomes in 
practice in terms of net costs alone, or even net benefits when avoided climate damage is 
considered (see also the similar conclusion by Ringius et al., 2002, with regard to the practical 
application of a set of equity principles that overlap somewhat with those presented in Table 
 201). The main outlier is the egalitarian principle, especially in the international context given 
the huge populations of China and India, which would result in transfers in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars per year and is thus politically untenable. The reason for the relative 
homogeneity of outcomes is explained by features of the three major aspects of the 
determination of net benefits of climate policy. First, benefits (avoided climate change 
damages) are the same no matter how the permits are allocated. Second, according to the 
Coase Theorem, there is a unique equilibrium (in this case mitigation costs) after property 
rights (emission permits) are exchanged, so this aspect does not vary. Third, the only feature 
that does vary is the purchase and sale of permits. Thus policy-makers might wish to look 
beyond philosophical issues in the negotiation process if they don't result in practical 
differences. Arguing over fine points for some equity principles may not be time well spent if 
the equity outcomes are relatively even for them not only in the case of permit trading but in 
general. 
 
3.4 The incidence of climate change policy 
In addition to emission permits, a carbon tax is also a policy instrument for mitigating climate 
change impacts that is often applied in economic analysis. A number of studies have 
examined the income distribution impacts of carbon taxes or carbon emission permits (see, 
e.g., Harrison, 1994; Dinan and Rogers, 2002; the reviews by Repetto and Austin, 1997; and 
Speck, 1999; and the more general review of incidence of pollution control in general by 
Parry et al., 2007). We begin by summarizing the three special features most emphasized to 
distinguish the impacts of these policies in contrast to the incidence of taxes in general. 
 
First, although the initial focus is on a few but very prominent sectors that emit carbon 
(Coal/Oil/Gas extraction, transportation, and refining), the fundamental role of these products, 
however, means that carbon reduction policies will eventually ripple throughout the economy, 
with possibly surprising outcomes. This is one of the major reasons general equilibrium 
models are often used to evaluate incidence.  
 
Second, fossil energy products and most energy-intensive processed goods (food, housing, 
and automobiles) are necessities, making it relatively more difficult to substitute away from 
them. Spending on necessities is inversely related to income, and, hence, all other things 
being equal, carbon taxes would lean toward being regressive in partial equilibrium terms. 
 
 21Third, unlike most existing taxes, carbon taxes are not aimed primarily at raising revenue. 
Moreover, they do not intentionally create a distortion in the price system but are intended to 
correct one, though they can create some new, but likely lesser distortions through a tax-
interaction effect.  
 
These factors have important implications for the disposition of carbon tax revenues (or 
revenues from the auction of carbon emission permits) by the implementing authority 
(country or region), including the possibility of using carbon tax revenues for tax relief that 
promises to reduce the distortionary nature of the pre-existing tax system. This revenue 
recycling can take a number of forms (reductions in personal income taxes, corporation 
income taxes, etc.), with different distributional impacts. Again, however, the final impacts of 
these alternatives are not a priori obvious when one allows for general equilibrium 
considerations. 
 
Overall, a large number of other factors, both unique to carbon taxation and applicable to tax 
policy in general, can have a major bearing on the relative unevenness of impacts (OECD, 
1995; Parry et al., 2007). It is also important to note several factors that affect the size of the 
aggregate impact, since it will also have a bearing on the degree to which the baseline income 
distribution changes. Of course, the size of the aggregate impact can affect the distribution of 
impacts in highly nonlinear models or where such factors as income elasticities of demand 
vary strongly across income groups. Major factors include: 
 
1.  Magnitude of the carbon tax or emission permit price, and energy-intensity of the 
economy. The higher these factors, the larger the overall impact and the more profound 
income inequalities of impacts can become in relation to the baseline (Hamilton and 
Cameron, 1994).  
2.  The unit upon which the tax is based (e.g., energy equivalent, carbon emissions, or 
carbon content), the narrowness or breadth of products or entities on which that tax is 
imposed, and the point in the production or consumption process at which the tax is imposed. 
These bear on the relative bluntness or precision of the policy and hence its cost-effectiveness 
and overall impacts. For example, Barker and Kohler (1998) found a tax on energy as a whole 
to be regressive but a tax on motor fuels to be progressive (cf., however, Wiese et al., 1995; 
West and Williams, 2004) 
 223.  The extent of factor mobility, which determines the degree to which the impacts result 
in unemployment and capital retirements. For example, Kopp (1992) noted the regressivity of 
transitional effects on coal miners having to find jobs in other industries. 
4.  The degree to which the impacts result in unemployment. Those already in lower 
income groups are less able to withstand the shocks of both temporary and long-term 
unemployment (OECD, 1995; Fullerton and Heutel, 2005). 
5.  The extent to which general equilibrium effects are taken into account to capture 
production/income distribution/consumption interactions in response to the policy (OECD, 
1995; Oladosu and Rose, 2007). For example, a large decrease in coal production may have a 
disproportionate effect on income of high-wage unionized miners, but the decrease in their 
consumption may be for products that are characterized by a predominant number of low-
wage earners, such as food (see, e.g., Rose and Beaumont, 1988). 
6.  The extent to which dynamic effects are taken into account (e.g., with respect to 
savings and investment). The current income distribution has an effect on economic growth, 
which in turn affects future income distribution (Bovenberg et al., 2005). Here progressivity is 
often thought to have a detrimental effect on future growth, though the effect on future 
income distribution is ambiguous. Dynamic effects also have a bearing on asset markets, such 
as the extent to which financial returns are affected and its implications for investments 
(Harrison, 1994). 
7.  The use of annual income versus lifetime income as a reference base (e.g., as proxied 
by consumption). The latter is the more appropriate measure given the long-run nature of the 
issue (see, e.g., Dinan and Rogers, 2002). 
8.  The extent to which demographic considerations pertaining to household composition 
are taken into account (Hamilton and Cameron, 1994); related to this is the demarcation of 
income groups, especially at the highest and lowest levels (Kopp, 1992). 
9.         The type of policy instrument used.  Free granting of permits is likely to be more 
regressive than auctioning permits (or implementing a carbon tax) because the former 
provides assets to owners of capital, while the latter provides opportunities for progressive 
revenue recycling (Parry et al., 2007) 
10.  The type of revenue recycling (including lump-sum transfers) and in contrast to 
alternatives such as budget deficit reduction and individual and corporate tax relief (see, e.g., 
Goulder et al., 1997; Parry et al., 1999; Parry, 2004). The latter is usually considered the most 
regressive. 
 2311.       Market structure.  Regressive effects increase with the ability to shift the tax forward 
to consumers (Burtraw et al., 2001). 
12.  Basic parameters and assumptions of the analytical model (especially price elasticities 
of demand and supply, elasticities of substitution with respect to inputs and imports, market 
structure, labor supply elasticities, etc.).These factors determine the ability to shift the tax 
forward onto customers or backward onto factors of production. In terms of the latter, shifts 
on to labor are likely to be more regressive than shifts onto capital (see, e.g., Boyd et al., 
1995; Bovenberg et al., 2005). Also, the greater the variation in price and income elasticities 
of demand, the greater the potential progressivity or regressivity.  
 
If we try to summarize studies of carbon taxes on households, we find that the distributional 
effects of a carbon tax can often be regressive unless special circumstances prevail (Bye et al., 
2002; Oladosu and Rose, 2007). Consequently, there is likely to be a conflict between 
efficiency and equity goals, though this can be diminished somewhat if tax revenues are used 
either directly or indirectly in favor of the low-income groups.  Of course, other groups may 
seek relief as well.  Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) have derived a useful result that only a 
small portion of revenues are needed to leave corporations in the U.S. no worse off.
16 
 
3.5  Sectoral Impacts 
The sectoral impacts of climate mitigation policy depend on several considerations.  One is 
policy instrument choice and design.  Free granting of permits imposes a relatively lower 
burden on emitters, mainly carbon-intensive industry, as would the recycling of carbon taxes 
to reduce corporate tax rates.  Even more significant is the stringency of the emissions cap 
given the exponential shape of the mitigation cost curve is most sectors. 
 
Instrument choice and design is also a major influence on sectoral differentials.  Rose and 
Oladosu (2002) estimated that a cap and trade system in the U.S. to meet its Kyoto 
commitment would lead to a permit price of $128 per ton carbon equivalent if it was applied 
only to carbon mitigation.  Allowing for sequestration as well lowered the estimate of the 
permit price to $43, and adding methane mitigation lowered it further to $33.  Under the more 
narrow policy scope, sectoral output losses in the coal, oil and electric utility industries were 
projected to be 64%, 25%, and 13%, respectively, compared with 32%, 8%, and 4% for the 
                                                 
16 Note also, that while the carbon tax approach is usually characterized as comprehensive, it can be partial (as in 
a partial auction of permits) if some baseline emissions (or fuels in an "upstream" system) are exempted. 
 24most flexible of the three designs.  Also, not surprisingly, the agricultural and forestry sector 
impacts changed form a 3% output loss under the narrow scope to a 1% gain under the 
broadest scope  
 
Aune et al. (2007) focus on the impacts of climate policies for fossil fuel producers, 
particularly how different climate policy instruments such as CO2 taxes and renewable energy 
subsidies affect the profitability of fossil fuel production, given a fixed global climate target in 
the long term. They find that CO2 taxes reduce the short-term profitability to a greater extent 
than technology subsidies, since the competition from CO2-free energy sources does not 
become particularly noticeable until decades later. Most fossil fuel producers therefore prefer 
subsidies to their competitors above CO2 taxes. However, this conclusion does not apply to all 
producers. Oil producers outside OPEC lose the most by the subsidising of CO2-free energy, 
while CO2 taxes only slightly reduce their profits. This is connected to OPEC’s role in the oil 
market, as the cartel chooses to reduce its extraction significantly in the tax scenario. The 
reason is that OPEC considers the oil price as a decreasing function of its own production. It 
will then be able to keep up the oil price and therefore its marginal revenue from oil sales by 
reducing production. Thus, the non-OPEC countries can free ride on this production 
reduction. The results seem to be consistent with observed behaviour of important players in 
the climate negotiations, as the OPEC countries and the major coal and gas producing 
countries will lose most from an international climate policy with short term reduction goals, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol. These countries have also been major opponents to the treaty. 
 
 
Sathaye et al. (2007) lists many mitigation measures that improve productivity in nearly all 
sectors.  Also, concern over loss of competitiveness in many sectors may be misplaced.  
Zhang and Baranzini (2004) reviewed several empirical studies and concluded that energy or 
carbon taxes do not have a major effect on this concern (see also IPCC, 2001).  Still, over 
time, small changes in competitiveness can add up.  Unless carbon capture and sequestration 
solves its cost and environmental issues, we can anticipate the demise of the coal industry in 
many countries, and declines are likely in the oil industry.  No doubt renewable energy 
industries will flourish in any case. 
 
 25Note that mitigation in some sectors promotes various other aspects of equity.  For example, 
Sathaye et al. (2007, p. 726) points out that various agricultural mitigation and sequestration 
options in developing countries” promote social harmony and gender equality.” 
 
4. Equity in international climate negotiations 
As global warming is a typical global public good problem, where climate change depends on 
global emissions of greenhouse gases, there is no reason to expect the problem to be solved 
without an international agreement, as no country or government has economic incentives to 
mitigate what may be defined as the socially optimal amount. 
  
Before studying the process and outcome of negotiations, one interesting question is to study 
an ethical starting point for international greenhouse gas negotiations. Eyckmans and 
Schokkaert (2004) describe what they call an ideal approach or a normative view of 
greenhouse gas negotiations. The ethical focus is inspired by John Rawls’ Difference 
Principle (Rawls, 1971), and is to concentrate on the poorest people of the world. The top 
priority of an agreement, according to the authors, should be to raise the living standard of the 
poor people above the minimum living standard threshold. To do so, one should not ideally 
concentrate on nations as if they where individuals, as this will not take into account the 
distribution of income or consequences of global warming within the country. The authors 
also defend a consequentialist approach, which means that burdens should not necessarily be 
distributed according to past responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions as is often argued, 
but to help the extreme poor; the solution should be sensitive to consequences.
17 In addition to 
this, Eyckmans and Schokkaert take a position against the welfarism embodied in 
utilitarianism, as this does not take into account the position of the poorest. To raise the 
poorest people above a minimum threshold implies that they are given greater weight in the 
calculation of the aggregate than people with a high living standard. This may point in the 
direction of equity weighting as discussed above, and excludes simple sum ranking, such as 
maximizing world gross national product (GNP) as the aim of an international treaty. 
 
                                                 
17 One counter-example about responsibility offered by the authors is if we discover that a huge global 
environmental problem is caused by consumption of a commodity heavily concentrated in the poor area of the 
world. At the time of consumption nobody knew that this would create an environmental problem. Should then 
the poor world bear the burden of mitigation policies, or should the rich countries bear the largest burden? 
Eyckmans and Schokkaert (2004) favor the second answer. We follow up the subject of historical responsibility, 
see Section 5.3 below. 
 26The focus on the poor is particularly relevant as cheap reduction options are mainly found 
outside OECD, see above. But emission scenarios from IPCC show that business-as-usual 
emissions in these countries will grow considerably over the next decade (IPCC, 2000). In 
these scenarios, it is assumed that the developing countries will develop and reduce poverty. 
Even in the worst case scenario when it comes to economic growth, it is assumed that the 
average per capita income in developing countries is 12 times higher in 2100 than in 1990. 
However, to stabilize concentrations of CO2 at 450 or 550 ppm in 2100, which are often 
mentioned as stabilization goals, will require a substantial reduction in the emission growth 
for the developing countries.
18 
 
Most economic research on international climate negotiations has, however, focused on the 
process of negotiations using game theory (see, e.g., Barrett, 2005, for an overview). In this 
literature, one common assumption is that each negotiating country only take into account its 
own material payoff and acts as a selfish agent (i.e., not in line with the framework discussed 
above). Using non-cooperative game theory, assuming that agreements cannot be binding, 
analysts define a non-cooperative outcome in greenhouse gas emissions, which is a Nash 
equilibrium where countries do not cooperate, but takes the other country’s actions into 
account when deciding their emissions. In contrast, a full cooperative outcome is defined as 
the outcome that maximizes the aggregate payoff to all countries. This outcome is not 
sustainable, as most countries will benefit from free riding on other countries’ emission 
reductions. The challenge is to improve the non-cooperative outcome or to sustain the full 
cooperative outcome.  
 
The conclusions from this literature do not seem very optimistic if the aim is to reduce climate 
change (Barrett, 2005). A self-enforcing agreement, in such a way that no signatory can gain 
by withdrawing and no non-signatory can gain by acceding is hard to construct and will in 
general fail to sustain the full cooperative equilibrium. The number of signatories will be 
small compared to the number of players in the game, or the emission reductions will be small 
compared to the full cooperative outcome. However, it should be noted that a self enforcing 
                                                 
18 An interesting equity aspect therefore concerns the choice between economic development and preserving the 
environment. While this sustainability problem clearly concerns intergenerational equity, it is also a question of 
equity within one generation; do we have to choose between less poverty and a good environment for people 
living in 2100, or is a good environment necessary for development? The latest IPCC report (Sathaye et al., 
2007) discusses this problem but argues that greenhouse gas emissions “are influenced by but not rigidly linked 
to economic growth”. It further argues that development aid and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
may help reduce vulnerability and provide financial resources for development. 
 27agreement does not take fairness into account. Compliance is a further problem, as credibility 
of punishments is in general small. But, there may be ways to improve the agreement by using 
side payments as well as linking the environmental negotiations to other non-environmental 
issues such as international trade (see, e.g., Folmer et al., 1993). 
 
Players may, however, not only care about material benefits. This is for instance studied by 
Hoel and Schneider (1997), who assumes that there is a cost to deviate from a social norm 
saying that countries should not free ride. Thus, this is a penalty that increases in the 
participation of others, and this cost is born by the free riders only. In this way the problem of 
credible punishments as discussed above are avoided. Not surprisingly, this norm leads to 
more cooperation. In addition to this, equity arguments have often been seen as a means to 
facilitate negotiations, as equity principles may serve as focal points that may reduce 
negotiation costs (Schelling, 1960). Preferences for equity may improve cooperation in 
international environmental agreements compared to the relatively pessimistic predictions 
from the traditional economic models (Lange and Vogt, 2003; Lange, 2006). However, this is 
based on the assumption that countries agree on a single equity criterion. This may not be the 
case. Lange et al. (2007a), demonstrates the self-serving use of equity principles, meaning that 
countries put forward the equity principle that serve their interests; support for an equity 
principle is stronger the less costly it is compared to the alternatives.
19 The bargaining power 
of the parties may depend on the possibility of using self-serving equity criteria supporting 
their demands.  
 
This discussion leads us into the field of behavioral economics, which emphasizes that people 
are not solely motivated by material payoffs and that perceived fairness and social norms 
influence decisions (see, e.g., Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008). This is relevant as 
personal communication is important in negotiations and also as Governments may like to 
implement the preferences of people. Some of the conclusions from this literature are more 
optimistic when it comes to mitigate climate change and achieve a fair outcome, for instance 
that people are willing to choose cooperative behavior but only if others are doing so. They 
are also willing to contribute more to good social causes if they think other people are 
contributing, and teams seems to act more altruistic than individuals, which may be good 
news in negotiations where countries are represented by a group of people. Further, 
                                                 
19 Social preferences may also depend on nationality and culture, see, e.g., the seminal paper of Roth et al. 
(1991) or Konow (2008) for a recent study.  
 28reciprocity such as punishments is not always motivated by future gains but also of what is 
considered fair or right, which may make punishments more credible. But on the other hand, 
people’s behavior does not always support fair outcomes. What is perceived as fair is often 
influenced by self interest, as mentioned above, and we like to avoid situations and 
information that would force us to reflect over ethical issues if this is in conflict with our 
material interests (Nyborg, 2008). 
 
The last step in international climate agreements is for signatories to choose their emission 
levels, i.e., the outcome of the agreement. If countries are symmetric, i.e., equal, it is usually 
assumed that signatories choose their emission levels to maximize the total payoff, which 
again requires equal provisions or emission reductions. For asymmetric or heterogeneous 
countries, other solution concepts are studies such as the Nash bargaining solution where 
gains are distributed according to bargaining power, the core focusing on the grand coalition 
of all countries where no coalition of countries can gain by rejecting the proposal, and the 
Shapley value where the gain is distributed by side payments that average each player’s 
marginal contribution to the different coalitions that might form (Barrett, 2005). These 
concepts do not explicitly take into account fairness, and illustrates that there may be a 
conflict between equity and efficiency considerations. This leads us into the discussion of 
implementing climate agreements using price incentives. 
 
5. Implementing climate agreements using price incentives  
5.1 Carbon taxes 
To find the efficient abatement level in each country, the standard economic recommendation 
is to use Pigouvian taxes on the harmful emissions. Optimizing a global welfare function 
would require that the tax should be set so that it reflects the marginal social damage of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Alternatively, the tax should be set so that the emission target from 
a climate agreement is met. In the first best optimum, this would lead to a uniform tax of all 
polluters, i.e. across sectors and countries. Thus, the optimal carbon tax should be globally 
uniform. This is also the recommendation in the Stern Review (Stern, 2007).  
 
This result was first criticized by Eyckmans et al. (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1994). 
They study the outcome of maximizing a social welfare function, where fairness can be taken 
into account by welfare weights. The result from this optimization problem is that weighted 
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traditional view that marginal costs of abatement across countries should be equalized to 
achieve efficiency. If the weighted marginal utility of consumption of the private good is 
higher in poor countries than in rich, marginal abatement costs should be lower in poor 
countries than in rich. However, the papers demonstrate that if side payments (lump sum 
transfers) are made available, a cost-effective solution in the traditional sense may be restored. 
This would require substantial transfers from rich to poor countries. Based on this, Sheeran 
(2006) notes that international transfers to developing countries are necessary for efficiency, 
even if these are usually favored on equity grounds. 
 
Another critique of the standard results follows from the realism of the assumptions. A first 
best solution is characterized by no constraints on the use of policy instruments. Lump sum 
transfers are for instance included in the set of feasible polices. If these assumptions are not 
met, the standard result of a uniform global carbon tax must be reconsidered, see, e.g., 
Sandmo (2007). Consider, e.g., two countries, one rich and one poor. If lump sum transfers 
are not possible, and if the global social welfare function is egalitarian, the tax in the poor 
country should be lower than in the rich. This means that the poor country can devote more 
resources to the production of private goods and less to the public good (the environment) and 
this will therefore work as an income transfer from the rich country to the poor. Note that this 
will not separate efficiency and justice considerations. Non-uniform taxes have the cost of 
lower production efficiency, but will still increase the global social welfare under the 
assumptions above. Sandmo (2005) provides a discussion on the implications of this result for 
a world of many countries. Instead of introducing country-specific tax rates, one possibility is 
to introduce a small number of tax-rates and applying them to groups of countries. 
 
5.2 Reluctance to trade emission permits and moral motivation 
One alternative to carbon taxes are tradable emission permits. Under the ideal assumptions 
mentioned above, tradable emissions permits will lead to the same outcome as a uniform 
carbon tax. The polluters will face a uniform price of polluting, which will foster the 
traditional cost efficiency in environmental policy making (see, e.g., Montgomery, 1972; 
Schmalensee et al., 1998). 
 
However, permit trading has been opposed by many such as environmental organizations and 
political parties on other grounds than rejecting the ideal assumptions. Some consider trade in 
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pay indulgence, see the discussion of environmental justice above and Goodin (1994). In the 
Kyoto protocol, trade in pollution permits is allowed, but only as a supplement to national 
mitigation.
20 This mechanism may have been introduced as a consequence of the majority of 
the signatories being reluctant about permit trading. Also in the European Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) proposals have been raised to limit the access to buy emission reductions in 
third party countries (JI – Joint Implementation for economies in transition and CDM - Clean 
Development Mechanism for developing countries) in the third phase (2013-2020). Why is 
there reluctance to trade in certain goods such as pollution permits?
21 
 
There have been some arguments against trade in emission permits based on consequences 
(consequentialist equity), such as adverse effects of CDM (e.g., it may create bad incentives 
such as to overstate the emission reductions from a project) and Hot Air (some countries get 
initial emission quotas that are higher than their actual emissions, thus the effect on the 
environment is small) and loss of potential national benefit from a pollution permit system 
(e.g., positive spillovers of technology development and ancillary benefits) and environmental 
justice. However, based on procedural equity, it is not enough to know that the action is the 
most effective way to attain the aim. One can for instance argue that industrialized countries 
have created the global warming problem, and that is their duty to reduce the consequences of 
it by cleaning up their own backyard, even if this is does not minimizes overall abatement 
costs. Another argument is based on unfair background conditions. Even if two parties agree 
to trade permits, the trade may not be justified on ethical reasons. A voluntary agreement 
between two parties is not necessarily fair if it is entered into under conditions that are not fair 
(Pogge, 1989). Background justice is not preserved when some participant’s basic rights, 
opportunities or economic positions are grossly inferior. 
 
Eyckmans and Kverndokk (2008) investigate how moral considerations, modeled as 
preservation of identity, i.e., a person’s self image - as an individual or as a part of a group 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005), affect an endogenous pollution permit trading 
equilibrium, in which governments choose in a non-cooperative way the amount of permits 
they allocate to their domestic industries, i.e., aggregate emissions are determined in the 
                                                 
20 However, attempts to implement a strict supplementarity requirement, such as limiting permit purchases to 
50% of GHG reduction requirements, have failed. 
21 For a recent survey on distaste or repugnance for certain transactions, see Roth (2007). 
 31equilibrium. They show that governments’ moral concerns may actually increase global 
emissions but this result depends on the precise formulation of the identity function, i.e., how 
identity is specified. For instance if potential permit importers feel reluctant to buy permits, 
global emissions will be higher than in an endogenous permit trading equilibrium without 
moral concerns. The reason is that permit importers over-allocate their domestic firms in 
order to reap strategic permit trade gains (because of lower global permit prices) and to reduce 
the amount of permits they have to import and hence their loss of identity. However, if there 
is also reluctance to sell permits, the opposite effect may take place and global emissions 
might be lower than compared to the case without moral concerns. Finally, if identity depends 
on the gap between actual and ideal emission levels, i.e., a higher gap means lower identity, 
and where the first-best Pareto efficient emission allocation is defined as the ideal (see Brekke 
et al., 2003), global emissions will always be lower when moral concerns are present. 
 
Both tradable emission permits and carbon taxes are policy instruments working through price 
incentives. There is now a growing literature on how price incentives interact with moral 
motivation and considerations. First, price incentives such as taxes may crowd out moral 
motivation to contribute to a public good such as a good environment as it may change the 
responsibility of the problem from the individual to the regulating authority (Frey, 1997; 
Brekke et al., 2003), so the net effect may be low. However, reciprocity, which means that 
people reward kind actions and punish unkind actions, may work the other way (Rabin, 1993; 
Camerer, 2003). If people know that polluters are punished they may be willing to contribute 
more too. Finally, if people are concerned about social norms, i.e., a rule of behavior that is 
enforced by social sanctions, public policy may have large effects. In general models of social 
norms give multiple equilibria (Nyborg and Rege, 2003; Rege, 2004); the more people that 
follow the norm, the higher are the sanctions and new information may move the society from 
one equilibrium to another. A carbon tax may for instance give information about the severity 
of climate change as this is a sign that the Government takes climate change seriously, and, 
therefore, change the social norm and bring the society to a new equilibrium where people act 
more environmental friendly than before.  
 
5.3 The allocation of emission permits 
In Eyckmans and Kverndokk (2008) discussed above, it was assumed that before emission 
trading, governments choose in a non-cooperative way the amount of permits they allocate to 
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22 In this way, the total emission reduction depends on the allocation 
of permits. This resembles closely the reality of international climate negotiations so far, in 
particular in the run up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and in the coming negotiations on a follow 
up agreement for the post-Kyoto period, as well as the EU’s emission trading system (ETS).
23 
 
However, it has been argued that if the total emission reduction is set independently of the 
distribution of tradable emission permits, a system of tradable permits makes it possible to 
separate efficiency and justice considerations, given that the outcome of the trade is 
considered equitable. Under the assumption of a competitive market, cost-effectiveness will 
result from trade no matter how permits initially are distributed (Montgomery, 1972), see also 
the discussion of the Coase Theorem in Section 2.2.
24 Based on this, the initial distribution of 
permits can be discussed as an intragenerational distributive justice problem as it concerns the 
distribution of income within the current generation.
25 
 
This view is challenged by the result in Eyckmans et al. (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal 
(1994), as referred above, that weighted marginal costs and not the marginal costs of 
abatement should be equalized across countries. These results have implications for tradable 
emission permits and Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) suggest that one may need to look at a 
Lindahl equilibrium rather than a Walrasian equilibrium in tradable permits, as a Lindahl 
equilibrium assigns a different price for the public good for each agent (region) based on 
his/her willingness to pay. This is followed up in Chichilnisky et al. (2000) who also show 
that in the absence of Lindahl prices, only a final number of initial permit allocations can lead 
to efficiency. Thus, the traditional result that efficiency and equity matters may be separated 
with tradable emission permits does not necessarily hold. 
 
However, several studies have looked at how distributive justice should ideally be taken into 
account in the allocation of tradable emission permits. Below we present three views. 
 
                                                 
22 This modeling framework was first suggested in Helm (2003). 
23 The amount of emissions permits brought under the EU cap is not fixed. 
24 Market power may be a problem in the international permit market (see, e.g., Hagem and Westskog, 1998, 
2008). Concerns have been raised that market power may arise that would skew the distribution of permit 
revenues in favor of one or a group of countries (e.g., Eastern European countries as they are the largest sellers). 
Given the size of the international permit trading market and number of potential players, this is unlikely to be a 
major concern at that level. However, it may matter in some interregional trading initiatives. 
25 This assumed that there is separability of intergenerational and intragenerational justice. 
 33Kverndokk (1995) was one of the first to evaluate different permit allocations for carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions permits based on theories of distributive justice. To do this, he 
proposed one way to solve this problem, namely by using the meta-principles introduced in 
Section 2.4 above, that is ethical individualism and presentism, together with a generally 
accepted principle in global theories of justice of avoiding distributions based on moral 
arbitrariness, i.e. on morally arbitrary factors, factors that are not relevant for the distribution 
problem. An analysis using these principles of justice requires a list of competing allocation 
rules, since we can say which rules from a given list violate the principles, but we cannot 
determine the “best” allocation rule. Thus, the following simple allocation rules were 
evaluated: 
 
•  A distribution proportional to current CO2 emissions. 
•  A distribution inversely proportional to accumulated CO2 emissions. 
•  A distribution proportional to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or to GDP adjusted by 
purchasing power parities. 
•  A distribution proportional to land area. 
•  A distribution proportional to population. 
 
According to the analysis in Kverndokk (1995), a distribution of permits proportional to 
population (equal per capita criteria) appears to be the only rule from the list of alternative 
allocation rules that is in accordance with all the three principles of justice. However, this 
would require substantial transfers from rich to poor countries (see, e.g., Rose et al., 1998). 
 
Neumayer (2000) also agrees on an equal per capita basis for allocating emission rights, but 
he argues in favor of historical accountability, i.e., every human is given an equal share of the 
global resource atmosphere independent of place and time. He defines the term Historical 
Emission Debt (HED), which measures how much countries have emitted compared to their 
share of world population from the start year, where depreciation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere is taken into account. Countries with a positive HED has to compensate countries 
with a negative HED in the annual permit allocations. Neumayer has three arguments in favor 
of historical accountability. First, science supports this rule as climate change is a 
consequence of the increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which is a 
function of accumulated emissions. Second, historical accountability is consistent with the 
 34polluter-pays-principle, which is a well established principle within the OECD countries 
(OECD, 1974). Finally, historical accountability is supported by the principle of equality of 
opportunity (Rawls), i.e., everybody should have an equal opportunity to benefit from 
emissions. Neumayer argues against several objections to this allocation rule, such as past 
generations were ignorant and the developed countries should therefore not be held 
responsible, that present generations must not be held accountable for something that was not 
caused by themselves, positive spillover effects from the emitting to the non-emitting 
countries, practical reasons such as boundary changes and massive economic costs, and 
finally, that historical accountability is closely correlated with current emissions.  
 
Helm and Simonis (2001) also agree that the equitable distribution of the initial endowment of 
emission permits should be based on the equal per capita criteria, but have not addressed the 
problem of accounting for historical emissions. However, they argue that this is only a “local” 
equity problem (see Section 2.4 above), and that the “global” equity problem is to develop 
criteria for a just exchange or trade of the initial endowment of permits. The authors suggest 
the following criteria for this exchange to be equitable, based on the idea that the use of the 
common resource (the atmosphere) should exhibit a certain degree of solidarity: 
 
•  Pareto efficiency: There should be no reallocations that make someone better off 
without making anyone worse off, i.e., there should be an efficient final allocation of 
permits. 
•  Envy-freeness: Every agent should (weakly) prefer his own share of the common 
resource and compensatory payments to the share of any other agent.  
•  Individual rationality (lower bound): No agent should be made worse off by the trade 
in emission rights than he was beforehand. This means that compensation should be 
equal to abatement costs. 
•  Stand-alone criterion (upper bound): No agent should be made better off than he 
would be if he were able to use the whole resource on his own. This means that no 
country should receive compensation higher than the abatement costs it would save 
with the quantity of global emissions rights, i.e., without any abatement efforts. 
 
Based on the two latter criteria, the North (developed countries) would have to offset all of the 
South’s (developing countries) abatement costs, but the South should not demand any 
 35additional transfers and would have to consent to reduction measures required for reasons of 
efficiency (the first criterion). This solution will also be envy-free (the second criterion). 
 
If the reallocation of initial entitlements based on equal per capita emission is governed by 
competitive markets, the market driven final allocation of permits will violate the stand-alone 
criterion as developing countries will be better off than without any environmental 
restrictions. The authors suggest another mechanism where all countries are assured the 
minimum resulting from competitive allocation and stand-alone utility, called the “WESA 
mechanism”
26 that will meet all four criteria above. Based on this, the authors claim that we 
will achieve both local and global equity if the permits are initially distributed according to an 
equal per capita allocation and the WESA mechanism is used for the exchange of permits.
27 
However, if competitive markets are used without any restrictions, this would require a 
different initial allocation rule to meet the criteria above. Helm and Simonis (2001) show that 
developing countries then would be given less and developed countries more than the equal 
per capita distribution initially to meet the stand-alone criterion. But the difference from the 
equal per capita distribution will diminish over time due to the high growth rates in 
greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. This allocation rule resembles the initial 
allocation rule suggested by Cline (1992), where permits are allocated according to current 
emission levels initially and then converge into an equal per capita distribution over time (or 
what has become known as the “contraction and convergence principle”). 
 
The outcome of the trade or the exchange is, however, dependent on how emissions of a 
country are measured. This opens a discussion on how to assign responsibility for greenhouse 
gas emissions. The traditional approach is to assign responsibility for emissions from your 
geographical area, so that emissions from production processes in a country like Norway are 
assigned to Norway independent of its consumption (production accounting principle). This is 
the approach used in the Kyoto Protocol (see also IPCC, 1996). With this approach, a country 
may have a high living standard and relatively low emissions if it imports all its carbon 
intensive goods. An alternative is consumer responsibility, which is to assign emission 
responsibility for all emissions that follow from the process that finally ends in consumption 
                                                 
26 WESA = Walrasian mechanism with the stand-alone utility as an upper bound. Thus, this refers to a market 
driven equilibrium outcome with restrictions.  
27 For a new study that is also concerned about the fair exchange of permits, see Böhringer and Helm (2008). 
They provide simulation results from a computable general equilibrium model with an upper welfare bound that 
restricts the income from selling permits. 
 36(see, e.g., Ferng, 2003).
28 In this way, a country’s living standard would be more closely 
connected to its emissions.
29 There are pros and contras for both approaches. The production 
accounting principle gives incentives for cleaner and more energy efficient production process 
(including technology development), but also incentives to transfer dirty production to the 
developing world or countries that have not signed a climate treaty (carbon leakages). The 
reverse will be the case for the consumption accounting principle. A consequence of the latter 
principle would probably be that developing countries are assigned lower levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions, while the developed world would be assigned a higher level. 
Bastianoni et al. (2004) argues for a principle that represents an intermediate approach, where 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) should be “assigned to countries or phases of the process in 
proportion to the embodied GHG emissions needed along the chain”. 
 
What should be considered the fair approach for assigning responsibility for emissions? 
Bastianoni et al. (2004) argue that the consumption accounting principle is fairer than the 
production accounting principle because it would make final users pay for the greenhouse gas 
“bill”. However, production processes are also beneficial for producing countries, and typical 
examples of this are countries producing and exporting products based on natural resources 
(oil, gas, fish, and water power). Thus, we think this issue has to be discussed further from an 
ethical perspective. 
 
6. What equity principles have actually been used? 
Cazorla and Toman (2001) have pointed out that a single or compound formula, involving a 
combination of equity considerations, is unlikely to satisfy the self-interest of the majority of 
the industrialized and developing countries to obtain a truly international agreement. It could 
also be said that such a formula might not satisfy a consensus of countries in terms of pure 
equity considerations either. Cazorla and Toman suggest that the “dynamic graduation” 
formulas, such “contraction and convergence” (Jacoby et al., 1998; Meyer, 2000), nicely 
balance short-term and long-term interests of all parties (see also the approach recommended 
by Nordhaus, 1997). 
 
Victor (1999) has claimed that equity has had little influence on negotiating and implementing 
international agreements on climate change. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, 
                                                 
28 This is related to the literature on the Ecological Footprint, see, e.g., Wackernagel and Rees (1996). 
29 A third possibility could be to assign responsibility for production of fossil fuels. 
 37Victor (2001) suggests that self interest will continue to dominate uncertainties about future 
emission trajectories and thus make it difficult to identify equitable permit allocations, and 
that, in the end, compliance will not be forth coming if it is not in a country’s self interest.  
A recent compendium of papers on the Post-Kyoto World edited by Aldy and Stavins (2007) 
also give short shrift to equity.  However, Lange et al. (2007b) performed a statistical analysis 
of survey responses of people involved in international negotiations and concluded that equity 
was considered important, with a stronger preference being expressed by members of G77 
countries. The most favored principles overall of the small set of six examined are polluter 
pays, egalitarian, and ”poor losers” (basically analogous to the Rawlsian Maximin). Ringius 
et al. (2002) concluded that appeals to fairness make it more likely that agreement will be 
reached, and, based on an analysis of the proposals presented by several countries in the run-
up to Kyoto, have identified a set of such principles that are widely accepted—equality, 
equity and exemptions for parties who lack the capacity to contribute. Still, this begs the 
question of whether negotiators can agree on specific principles for allocating the burden of 
GHG mitigation.  
 
Despite the extensive examination of equity by analysts and bargaining by policy makers, its 
application in climate change policy at all levels has been rather unsophisticated. Only a 
couple of traditional principles, as well as a few pragmatic allocation rules based on political 
compromise, have dominated. For example, the prevailing principle has been what we termed 
“Sovereignty” in Table 1 — equal proportional emissions reductions by all parties. Because 
both mitigation costs and benefits are unequally distributed, this is inconsistent with all other 
allocation-based and outcome-based principles. It might appear that, because it is the outcome 
of negotiations, it is consistent with process-based allocations in general and consensus equity 
in particular, but this smacks of circular reasoning. 
 
The prime example of using Sovereignty equity based on GHG emissions is the Kyoto 
Accord, where any departure from the rough group average emission cap had to be justified 
by “differentiated responsibilities,” based on special conditions in an individual country. 
Thus, transitional economies, such as Russia, were allowed lower commitments because of 
their economic difficulties, despite the fact that their economic downturns would lead to lower 
emissions in the future anyway, thus exacerbating the “hot air” problem. Other special 
circumstances included Australia’s emissions cap of 108% of its 1990 baseline (in 
 38comparison to the group average of approximately 93% of 1990 levels) because of its heavy 
reliance on coal exports. Note that differentiation was not put forth expressly as an equity 
principle but as an ad hoc appeal to special circumstances. The industrialized countries were 
wary of using equity as an explicit argument, because they were concerned the argument 
could be turned against them by more than 100 developing countries (DCs) at some time in 
the future. 
 
Similar proportional emission cutbacks pervaded the major regional climate agreement in the 
U.S.—the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) among Northeast and Mid-Atlantic 
states. More recently, however, as the target date nears and concerns about compliance costs 
increase, discussions have arisen about target levels and relative positions of individual 
states.
30 Based on this experience, those beginning to negotiate a GHG trading arrangement in 
the Western States in the U.S., the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), are beginning to look at 
equity head-on. Their first foray at the time of this writing is a mixed formula for future 
emissions growth that involves a weighted average of proportional cutbacks, energy use, and 
population. Still, the focus is on simple reference bases, rather than a deeper discussion of 
equity.  Moreover, the mixed formula represents more of a way of achieving group consensus 
and finesses the hard choice of a single criterion. 
 
The major area in which equity is now critical and under which much activity is underway is 
in bringing DCs into the fold in terms of actual mitigation commitments, or simply 
involvement in flexibility mechanisms beyond CDM. One equity formula that has been 
popular for years and holds the prospect of easing some of the tensions regarding the 
egalitarian principle is “contraction and convergence” (see, e.g., Cline, 1992) This calls for 
proportional cutbacks of emissions with respect to a baseline level among individual countries 
now but with eventual adjustment over time to a point where emission permits would be 
assigned on a per capita basis. It is believed that the 20-30 year convergence target date would 
give industrialized countries time to adjust so that the large future emission reductions or 
permit purchases would not be anywhere near as costly as would be the implementation of the 
egalitarian principle during the first, or even second, Kyoto compliance period (Jacoby et al., 
1999).  
                                                 
30 Several of the RGGI states have decided to auction rather than grandfather their permits and to use the 
revenues to promote energy efficiency including effectively lowering energy prices and targeting low-income 
households for energy efficiency investments (State of Maine, 2007).  
 39 
The second approach is the “no harm” principle (see Edmonds et al., 1995), which calls for an 
allocation of permits that would result in no net positive costs for DCs. Rose et al. (1998) 
have pointed out that this is essentially a variant of a welfarist version of the Rawlsian 
Maximin principle.
31 In any case, there are two interpretations of the no-harm rule. The first is 
to give DCs permits equal to their baseline emissions. The advantage is that it means they 
have a sufficient number of permits such that no mitigation is necessary, nor is it necessary 
for them to be involved in the permit market initially. However, once they are comfortable 
with doing so, it is hoped that DCs would see the advantage of selling permits to gain 
revenues. When they do so, industrialized countries will gain by having their compliance 
significantly lowered by access to relatively cheaper mitigation/sequestration options. The 
second variant of the no-harm rule calls for permit allocations for DCs such that, after trading, 
they incur no net costs, i.e., any revenue gains from trading are limited because permit 
allocations are set below baseline levels. In this case, DCs incur no net costs and 
industrialized countries, which will still incur positive net costs, are still helped by access to 
relatively cheaper options. Note that the first variant is an “allocation-based” principle, where 
individual country permit levels are determined at the outset. The second is an “outcome-
based” rule that considers the results of the post-trading stage. The first involves less 
uncertainty than the second because it is not based on an unknown second step. The 
uncertainty, however, can be reduced by a central authority ensuring a zero net cost outcome 
through financial transfers out of a common pool, whose funds might be provided by 
industrialized countries or by any excess revenues (over zero net cost) from the group of 
DCs.
32 In the second case, DCs are more likely to be engaged in permit trading because the 
initial permit allocation requires them to undertake mitigation, and they will be looking for 
ways to reduce compliance costs. Rose and Wei (2008) have simulated the implications of 
these two permit allocations for Pacific Rim countries and found that the first allocation 
variant would result in significant gains for China and other developing countries, while, of 
course, the second would have a neutral effect on them. Interestingly, the largest absolute 
gains in either case are projected to go to industrialized countries, most notably Japan.  
 
                                                 
31 We have listed the Rawlsian Maximin principle in the group of outcome-based equity criteria in Table 1. 
However, many would argue that Rawls was not so much interested in the outcome as in the process. 
32 Of course the practicality of such an arrangement is open to question. 
 407. Equity and uncertainty - are emission reductions really necessary or are 
there other ways? 
To significantly reduce the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, broad 
international cooperation is required. As discussed in Section 4, the literature is not very 
optimistic when it comes to a broad international agreement on emission reductions, due to 
the incentives to free ride. However, other approaches to reduce climate change have been 
proposed over the last couple of decades. One alternative is geoengineering, which seems to 
be a taboo in the debate on climate policy, and most economic analyses of climate change 
have ignored it.
33 Geoengineering does not have a singular definition, but we follow Barrett 
(2008) who refers to measures that counteract climate change by reducing the amount of solar 
radiation that strikes the earth.
34 Examples of this are installation of a barrier to sunlight 
between the earth and the sun, placing various particles or gases in the atmosphere to block 
incoming sunlight, or to make low-level clouds from sea water that also would reflect 
incoming sunlight. While geoengineering will not reduce the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, it will decouple temperature from the atmospheric concentration. 
Still, a host of known problems, such as increasing ocean acidification, as well as many 
unknowns, remain. 
 
IPCC regards geoengineering as “largely speculative and may have a risk of unknown side 
effects” (Barker et al., 2007). However, there are reasons to believe that such measures will 
become higher on the political agenda in the future. In contrast to emission reductions, some 
of the proposals are inexpensive and can, thus, be undertaken by a single country unilaterally 
(Barrett, 2008).
35 Thus, in contrast to agreements on emission reduction, where it is hard to 
create incentives to sign an agreement, here countries have an incentive to do this unilaterally 
or as a part of a small coalition. 
 
There are several ethical aspects connected to geoengineering that are not fully discussed. 
One aspect of procedural ethics is to what extent we should change the functioning of the 
nature. We are in a process of changing the climate on the earth due to our emissions of 
greenhouse gases. Is changing the climate due to bioengineering any different? Consider for 
                                                 
33 An early discussion is Schelling (1996). 
34 Other alternatives are iron or nitrogen fertilization of the oceans, see Barker et al. (2007). They may also be 
classified as geoengineering, but we choose to follow Barret’s (2008) definition. 
35 It has yet to be discussed whether unilateral action is in accordance with international law. 
 41instance the possibility to reduce solar radiation by emitting particles in the atmosphere. This 
already happens naturally from volcanic eruptions. Also, human activities due to burning of 
coal for instance emit sulfate particles in the atmosphere. What is the difference between these 
and particles we purposefully might place in the atmosphere to block sunlight? Can theories 
of justice guide us on this? Why is geoengineering actually considered a taboo in climate 
policy; is this due to the ethical concerns or just related to risk? An aspect of distributional 
justice has to do with winners and losers of geoengineering. How should we account for the 
fact that this measure will affect countries differently?  
 
Recently the debate over whether it is best to strongly mitigate GHGs or to be less stringent 
and simply adapt to the climate changes has accelerated.
36 Burden sharing for poor country 
adaptation to climate change gives rise to issues very similar to those discussed with respect 
to mitigation (Tol, 2005). However, the argument for adaptation is often facile and ignores 
irreversibilities, as well as the fact that prior success of human adaptation took hundreds, if 
not thousands, of years, and not merely decades. Since we are unlikely to actually reduce 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere in the foreseeable future, but just to slow their 
build-up, some adaptation will be necessary. Studies indicate that the poor, aged, and infirm 
are the least likely to cope. Women, who are typically lower paid, and who have a relatively 
greater responsibility for child rearing are also likely to find adaptation relatively more 
difficult because of their lower levels of resources and time, as well as more limited choices 
(IPCC, 2001). At the international level, the areas that are likely to be the most affected—
low-lying areas in general and the belt around the equator, i.e., the relatively poorer areas—
are also the ones that have the fewest resources to adapt. The Darwinian dictum of “survival 
of the fittest” rings hollow from an equity standpoint. However, as we need both mitigation 
and adaptation, we would welcome a better understanding of what is a fair international 
sharing of the burden for developing and deploying adaptation strategies (see Paavola and 
Adger, 2005, for a first approach). 
 
The problems mentioned here on uncertainty and risk also link to the precautionary principle 
(see, e.g., O’Riordan and Cameron, 1995) and the issues about the quality of life for future 
                                                 
36 There also exists a climate adaptation fund with the aim to help protect those most vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change, like drought, flooding and severe storms. The fund is managed by the Global 
Environment Facility, an independent financial organization, and was established in Kyoto in 1997, but has been 
criticized for being too difficult to access and for raising only paltry sums of money. Under an agreement 
reached by delegates at the UNCCC Bali conference in 2007, the adaptation fund is now to be maintained using 
a 2 percent tax on transactions within the Clean Development Mechanism. 
 42generations. Thus, the approaches discussed in this section have clear intergenerational 
aspects as well. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Equity cannot be ignored in climate change policy like it is in so many other policy realms. 
The fact that the problem is a global one and that the most-effective solutions require 
cooperation among sovereign entities means that fairness must be taken into account for 
reasons of positive economics even if there is a tendency to avoid the normative. Many 
principles of equity that are applicable at the interpersonal level translate nicely to the 
international and interregional levels and can serve as the basis of sound normative 
judgments.  
 
Interestingly, most climate agreements thus far have finessed some difficult equity issues. In 
the international domain, GHG mitigation targets have mainly been agreed to by 
industrialized countries, meaning those with the means to undertake them without seriously 
comprising their rates of economic growth. Variations in the commitments have been 
addressed with the euphemism of "differentiated responsibilities," a type of equity argument 
that appears easier to swallow. Similar situations of a limited range of diversity of interests 
have arisen in the regional trading initiative of the Europe Union and in relatively 
homogenous areas of the U.S. The difficult equity conflicts are still to be resolved, however, 
primarily getting developing countries, some of which are becoming the most prominent 
GHG emitters, to agree to significant mitigation targets and timetables.  
 
Research has helped advance climate policy on both efficiency and equity fronts. Cap and 
trade, under a broad set of conditions (auctioning versus free-granting, unrestricted prices 
versus price caps, current allocations versus banking/borrowing) has the ability to reduce 
emissions at least cost and to also address equity head on through the allocation of permits. 
While researchers have not solved the puzzle of identifying the best definition of equity, they 
have provided operational definitions and practical models that can be used by policy-makers 
to identify the implications of various alternatives.  
 
Although the main focus of equity in climate policy thus far has been across geographic areas, 
it is the individual level where equity is really measured. Traditional fiscal incidence analysis 
 43can readily be applied to the cost side of the equation, but equity on the benefit side represents 
the real challenge as potential catastrophic impacts of inaction continue to be identified. 
 
We have mentioned several topics in this paper where equity issues are not fully analyzed yet. 
As equity is important in social and political relations, we would also welcome more studies 
in economics where moral and ethical considerations are taken into account by the decision 
makers. People do not always act as Homo Economicus (Thaler, 2000), and economic models 
that take preferences for equity into account are important in the entire discipline of 
economics including environmental economics.  
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 TABLE 1. ALTERNATIVE EQUITY CRITERIA FOR GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION POLICY 
 
      
Criterion  Basic Definition  General Operational Rule 
 
Operational Rule for CO2 Permits 
    
      
Allocation-Based      
     
 
     
   
     
 
Sovereignty  All countries have an equal right to pollute 
and to be protected from pollution 
 
Cut back emissions in a proportional manner 
across all countries 
 
Distribute permits in proportion to emissions, 
energy-use, land area, etc. 
 
Egalitarian  All people have an equal right to pollute and 
to be protected from pollution 
 
Allow emissions in proportion to population  Distribute permits in proportion to population 
Ability to Pay  Mitigation costs should vary directly with 
economic well-being 
 
Richer countries should shoulder a higher 
proportion of gross cost of abatement 
 
Distribute permits inversely to GDP 
Econ Activity  All countries should be allowed to maintain 
their standard of living 
 
Richer countries should not be penalized  Distribute permits in proportion to GDP 
Outcome-Based      
     
  
    
    
 
Horizontal  All countries should be treated equally 
in terms of changes in welfare 
Equalize net welfare change across  
countries (net loss as proportion of GDP 
equal for each country)a 
 
Distribute permits to equalize net welfare 
change (net loss as proportion of GDP equal 
for each country)a 
 
Vertical  Welfare gains should vary inversely with 
economic well-being; welfare losses should 
vary directly with GDP 
Progressively share net welfare change 
across countries (net loss proportions 
directly correlated with per capitaGDP)a 
 
Progressively distribute permits (net loss 
proportions directly correlated with per capita 
GDP)a 
Compensation  No country should be made worse off  Compensate net losing countries  Distribute permits so no country suffers a net 
loss of welfare 
 
Process-Based      
     
 
 
Rawls' Maximin  The welfare of the worst-off country should 
be maximized 
 
Maximize the net benefit to the poorest 
countries 
 
Distribute largest proportion of net welfare 
gain to poorest countries 
 
  60Consensus  The negotiation process is fair  Seek a political solution promoting stability 
of the agreement 
Distribute permits in a manner that satisfies the 
(power weighted) majority  
 
Market Justice  The market is fair  Make greater use of market (auction)  Distribute permits to the highest bidder 
 
Source: Adapted from Rose (19920 and Rose et al. (1998) 
aNet welfare change is equal to the sum of mitigation costs + permit sales revenues - permit purchase expenditures. 
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